enterprises by their organizational form permits much broader conjectures to be made concerning the relationship between the structure of especially restrictive corporate laws and bureaucratic regulation, while New data were assembled from Japanese governmental reports and consist of a long panel on the organization and performance of enterprise for the 47 prefectures from 1896 to 1939. The dataset is constructed at the level of legal form, by industry, by prefecture, and by year. ground. Second, I document the data construction effort and present descriptive evidence on enterprises by type of legal organization over time, across prefectures and industries. Heavy use of the joint stock form stands out. Joint stock companies accounted for the largest share of all registered enterprises, followed by limited partnerships and unlimited partnerships. The share of enterprises by type remained roughly the unlimited partnerships.
was so dominant. While a range of idiosyncratic factors mattered, main Japanese businesses relied heavily on equity as opposed to bank debt. As choices towards the joint stock form. So too would the capital intensity demands of modernization (Tang, 2011) . In terms of industry structure the conglomerate form, or zaibatsu enterprise history. After about 1910 most zaibatsu began to reorganize from unlimited or limited partnerships to joint stock enterprises under a holding company arrangement. Finally, policy makers chose to make the joint stock form widely accessible, while cultural factors meant joint stock corporations had a particularly high prestige status.
between 1922 and 1939 joint stock corporations accounted for most of the joint stock form, perhaps to attract more outside capital. While endogeneity concerns cannot be ruled out, linking the descriptive results with -nisms and selection effects.
Fifth, it could be argued that the heavy use of the joint stock form may changes in the organization of enterprise following the passage of laws promulgating the Yugen Kaisha 1 The Yugen Kaisha [Yugen Kaisha Hou organizational forms becomes observable.
Following the legal reform the share of joint stock companies remained --tive drop in the formation of joint stock corporations. In Germany the cost of incorporation was particularly high and therefore the number of corporations was quite small. The GmbH substituted mainly for ordinary partnerships. Regardless of these differences, in Britain, France, that balanced tradeoffs associated with issues such as protecting against untimely dissolution and providing concessions to minority shareholders, which negated joint stock ownership. In Japan the tradeoffs 1 Several factors help to account for the heavy use of the joint stock post-WWII growth created opportunities for joint stock enterprises that A growth in stock ownership by banks and the connection of corporations through cross-shareholding keiretsu reinforced the corporate organization. Cultural norms favoring joint stock enterprise persisted, while imperfect regulatory boundaries did little to separate small closely-held chosen to organize as limited and unlimited partnerships.
the mid-twentieth century represented the product of, among other factors, institutional reform, infrastructure investment, technological development, and the marginalization of the old feudal system of the Tokugawa 2009; Nicholas 2011). Although growth was faster during the post-WWII "economic miracle" of the former years was not independent of the founIn categorizations of countries around the world by their civil and sense up to the mid-twentieth century given that Japan replicated elements was based on the German Handelsgesetzbuch, which had replaced the original 1861 legislation relating to companies in that country.
2 However, the interpretation of codes by judges, rather than relying on precedent as in common-law countries, had very little effect on the actual governance of enterprises.
The multifaceted nature of laws pertaining to enterprises is revealed The main attributes of each organizational form are given in Table 1 . It -limited liability. The Japanese joint stock form was distinct only in a few minor respects from that used in other countries, including fuller disclosure requirements and an increase in the scope of decisions that needed minority shareholders (Baum and Takahashi 2005, p. 376) . The organization of enterprise in this way represented a break from the guild system dominated. Japanese policy makers promoted joint stock companies according to the belief that they would facilitate large-scale capital intensive enterprise. This was considered to be a crucial factor for -progress and help commerce and industry thrive; to help commerce and industry thrive, we must establish joint-stock corporate organizations" (Shimada 2012, p. 9) . The joint stock form had an important impact on Japanese business organization. Zaibatsu enterprises-large diverse business conglomerates-started as ordinary partnerships but became joint stock corporathe Commercial Code, which mitigated downside risk without requiring -sures to disclose, along with governance considerations led many to The main dataset is a panel covering 47 prefectures from 1896 to 1939, three legal forms (limited and unlimited partnerships and joint industrial, mining, and transport). Hence, I observe each legal form by capital held by shareholders and owners of partnerships plus reserves are reported, and starting in the 1920s prefectural authorities also compiled making enterprises, which represents a particularly rich source of infor-2013).
Some advantages and disadvantages of the data are worth emphasizing. First, it is important to note that the data cover the universe of registered enterprises, yet the majority of Japanese enterprises were sole proprietorships and traditional Kumiai German stille Gesellschaften) that did not have to register (they were regulated by Civil Code provisions) and had no separate legal personality. As such, the entrepreneurial foundations of Japanese enterprise aggregated by business group and therefore the analysis cannot capture the performance of each zaibatsu. In other words, the panel tracks the performance of the average "representative" registered enterprise by out controls for omitted variables related to business owners choosing legal forms for reasons, such as unobservable investment requirements, that were constant over time but variable across enterprises. By using a higher level of aggregation as a unit of analysis, the approach trades registered enterprises.
Main Trends
Beginning with the raw data, Figure 1 shows trends in the number of registered enterprises. The kink in the series during the early 1920s is caused by two factors. First, data for the pre-1921 period slightly overstates the number of enterprises and thus the growth rate because these years include enterprises in suspension of business. Data from -tures to be destroyed. A fall in the number of enterprises during the late 1930s coincides with the Sino-Japanese War (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) . As Takafusa Nakamura (2003, p. 55) puts it: "the direct and indirect effects of the war national, business and household economies."
A clear trend to emerge from Figure 1 is the rapid development of busi--tered in 1896, but by 1939 there were more than 88,000, representing an annual average growth rate of 7 percent. Although Japan was starting from a low base given its early stage of development, and according to metrics like the number of corporations per capita or corporate share capital (at market or book) as a percentage of gross domestic product (Hannah 2015) , the growth rate is systematically pronounced across the Figure 2 highlights the changing organizational structure of Japanese business over time. For the period as a whole, joint stock companies accounted for the largest share of all enterprises (44 percent), followed by limited partnerships (around 40 percent), and unlimited partnerships a peak during the early 1920s before falling to a low point during the mid-1930s and rebounding by the end of the time period. In 1939 joint areas in absolute terms accounting for almost three quarters of enterprises between 1896 and 1939. 1902 1905 1908 1911 1914 1917 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932 1935 1938 1902 1905 1908 1911 1914 1917 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932 1935 1938 Joint Stock Limited Partnership Unlimited Partnership 1902 1905 1908 1911 1914 1917 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932 1935 1938 Joint relied heavily on public equity capital rather than bank debt for long-term bank intermediation was critical to the provision of long-term capital in Japan. Firms sold equity, issued bonds, or funded investment projects through retained earnings, with bank debt being a source of capital bank debt to gross assets of between 2 and 8 percent between 1919 and -tions, and following a rationalization phase, around 10 for the remainder 1902 1905 1908 1911 1914 1917 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932 1935 1938 Joint Stock Limited Partnership Unlimited Partnership for all the prewar benchmark years of 1913, 1929, and 1938 . In fact, countries in 1938. A second reason for the prevalence of the joint stock form relates to to Guinnane et al. (2007, p. 3) "the corporate form was important for enterprises such as railroads that had to raise enormous sums of capital in transport in Japan were railroad concerns and they collectively held - 5 The development of transjoint stock appears to have been associated with effective governance in industry were joint stock concerns so enterprises could grow and be managed beyond the boundaries of the family (Braguinsky et al. 2014) . zaibatsu enterprises ultimately became joint stock corporations.
the zaibatsu for increased disclosure and changes in governance structures played zaibatsu that can be traced back to the zaibatsu to alter its organizational into joint stock companies, which were held by family members using a limited partnership. This partnership became a joint stock corporation in A third reason can be broadly categorized as public policy and culture. -tion, legislative changes had an important effect on enterprise legal form.
5
[Nippon Yusen Kaisha ascribed a high level of prestige by Japanese business owners within the menu of enterprise choices, which meant that they were willing to Measuring Performance makes the most sense as a performance measure in this case given the rich data provided in the governmental reports on the capital held in enter--Banz 1981) and equity capitalization is a priced factor in the asset-pricing and basic difference in means tests. These show that the level of capital An obvious issue with this econometric approach is selection. Rather than being randomly determined, organizational form is a choice on the part of business owners and assuming a hierarchy of forms, then successful business owners may have simply selected to organize as a the adoption of the joint stock form, business owners may have chosen rates, especially in capital intensive industries, or because of development stage and industry structure, or public policy and cultural factors, greater degree of entrepreneurial "churn" through successes and failures --ited partnerships relative to the joint stock category.
Although ultimately the parameter estimates from equation (2) cannot be interpreted as causal, some progress can be made in addressing these and other potentially confounding issues. As robustness checks, separate given that the Japanese economy became even more militarized during the 1930s, and enterprises may have performed differently in a market---nization for each industry relative to the joint stock form. Furthermore, may have selected in to the joint stock form. Finally, following research matching methods are used. Figure 5 illustrates large differences by organizational form with respect to the distribution of capital, suggesting that for endogeneity concerns or omitted variable bias, but it can be used to these capital distributions.
Baseline Estimates and Robustness Checks
tion (2). Columns 1 to 4 sequentially add the prefecture, industry, and also including controls for leverage and capital. Column 9 presents the represent the largest concentrations of enterprises, and columns 10 and 11 partition the data according to time periods when the Japanese economy 6 The dependent variable, clustering of observations within prefectures. Given missing observations in the data volumes for some of the variables, the regressions are 
FIGURE 6
Notes 8 at these more granular levels the number of missing observations increases substantially, as does the cost of data collection. These reasons meant constructing the dataset at the level of the legal form, by main industry, by prefecture, and by year. Table 4A , column 1 is -2.18 when of the numerator of equation (1) and -2.30 in Table 4B , column 1 when form in Table 3 are being driven largely by the differences present in profitable enterprises. These results would be consistent with superior entreFinally, Table 5 introduces matching estimates. Whereas the baseline that particular assumption so that only closely comparable observations Using the full set of variables in column 8 of Table 3 a propensity score was used to estimate assignment probabilities into the categories between limited partnerships and joint stock enterprises is large, with a difference of -4.5 percentage points. However, the covariate balance test rejects the null hypothesis that the two groups of enterprises are closely matched according to their capital. Caliper matching in the second row of Table 5 provides more favorable balancing properties, establishing a -nerships compared to observationally similar joint stock enterprises. Although caliper matching leads to a substantial drop off in the number of matching pairs, reassuringly the matching estimates in Table 5 of -1.3 Table 3 . The third and fourth rows of Table 5 follow the same approach for enterprises. The mean differences are large and negative, as in in column 8 of Table 3 , although the covariate balance test fails to reject the null hypothesis of observational overlap in terms of capital. Although a variety size of enterprises, the selection of organizational form and performance, -nesses), the upshot of the matching results is to add robustness to the YUGEN KAISHA So far the analysis has shown that the joint stock form was heavily used in Japan during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Some business owners may have been constrained optimizers and have stock form, had it been available, as it was in other countries such as introduced.
The Yugen Kaisha in 1940. While much of the more general reforms at this time were based on the 1937 German Aktiengesetz, or stock corporation law, the intuition behind the Yugen Kaisha followed that of the German GmbH from 1892, although the precise structure of these respective legal forms differed in fundamental ways. Given the close historical correspondence between Japanese and German laws it is perhaps surprising that policy makers did not introduce the Yugen Kaisha earlier.
the Commercial Code as an "eclectic body of law embodying the best principles of the commercial laws of all other civilized nations" (De Becker 1913, p. 207) it could be argued that the introduction of the Yugen Kaisha was no demand for a structure that in the language of Guinnane et al. (2007, p. 2) , "combined the advantages of legal personhood and joint
Goushi Kaisha, and that the principal contribution of the Yugen Kaisha limited liability.
(1995) documents that Hermann Roesler included the idea of Sakin Kaisha, which allowed some partners to be unlimited liability partners through agreement among all partners in the articles of association.
change towards the Yugen Kaisha only originated in 1917 and 1918 with two academic studies published by Naojiro Sugiyama, from Tokyo University. Sugiyama pointed out that many countries had invoked laws Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry investigated laws in relation to various forms of enterprises, especially those with limited liability.
would "provide through a special law, recognition for a special form of company equivalent to a limited liability company under foreign laws, or Yugen Kaisha was submitted seven years later to the Imperial Diet, and it was enacted in 1940 along with other laws revising the Commercial Code.
The Yugen Kaisha (the GmbH had no member caps), imposed restrictions on the transfer of shares but required only one director, and limited reporting requirements. Unlike in the case of the GmbH, no voluntary undertaking of additional contractual obligations by means of the articles of association was permissible. Japan did not recognize any deviation from the limits of liability set out in it laws. With respect to membership caps, the Yugen Kaisha was form. 9 In effect the Yugen Kaisha law established an intermediary form between the limited and unlimited partnership and the joint stock form. 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Private Limited Liability Joint Stock
Limited Partnership Unlimited Partnership
Despite the introduction of the Yugen Kaisha the joint stock form advantageous for accessing equity markets, the joint stock form offered zaibatsu were eliminated or restructured as a consequence of the allied occupation, cross-shareholding developed under the new keiretsu both creditors and shareholders of the new industrial groups (Shishido corporate power and authority between the shareholders meeting, the board of directors, and corporate auditors as investor protections in joint stock businesses were strengthened; but in the long run regulations protecting Japan than in other countries (Hannah 2014) . A culture favoring the joint stock form persisted through the postwar era as it signaled advantages relationships with banks. Joint stock was a prestigious type of organization more generally despite being associated with higher administrative This article has assembled new data on the organization of enterprise of the broader research agenda initiated by Guinnane et al. (2007) . Their superior form of business organization in many advancing industrial nations. When governments offered business owners the opportunity to the take-up was generally rapid, and this process occurred in nations with both Anglo-American and French, or German, legal institutions. As such this body of works casts strong doubts on the alleged domination of both determinants of economic growth. a civil law country in which the joint stock form was probably just as popular as it was in the United States where a common law legal tradi-likely more pivotal in the process of Japanese modernization during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than it was in many other countries, including Germany, Britain, and France. It was prevalent over performance. Joint stock enterprises accounted for 94 percent of aggre--ex post insight into the potential selection preferences of business owners, the share of enterprises organized under joint stock ownership remained high. The Yugen Kaisha offered an intermediate choice to small-and medium-sized busithe Yugen Kaisha ultimately accounted for more than one-half of all registered enterprises, its relevance for satisfying the needs of both business owners and the government was severely negated in the long run. legal and organizational gap between the Yugen Kaisha and joint stock ownership. Under reforms in 2005, the Yugen Kaisha was abolished and replaced with the Godo Kaisha, which was modeled on the U.S. limited liability form.
